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Abstract. FRAM has been proposed as a method for the analysis of complex 
socio-technical systems, which may be able to overcome the limitations of tra-
ditional methods that focus on simple cause and effect relationships.  FRAM on 
its own may be most useful for modeling the system at a high level of abstrac-
tion.  There is less evidence about its utility for modeling interactions at greater 
levels of detail. We applied different modeling approaches to investigate situa-
tions that may give rise to functional resonance in an avionics case study.  
FRAM was used to model higher-level dependencies, HAMSTERS was used to 
provide a deeper understanding of human functions, and ICO-Petshop was used 
to model technical system functions. The paper describes preliminary results of 
the application of this federation of models, and highlights potential benefits as 
well as challenges that may have to be overcome. 
Keywords: Modeling approaches, Avionics, Socio-technical systems. 
1 Introduction 
The causality of accidents in modern transportation systems may be difficult to 
determine.  Investigations of past accidents and incidents have led to the development 
of improved system defences, which have significantly reduced the incidence of fatal 
accidents.  When accidents occur they tend to exhibit complex causalities.  Reason [1] 
referred to such accidents in modern well-defended systems as organizational 
accidents.  These accidents are typically multi-faceted, and they may involve 
unexpected interactions or unforeseen propagation of failures [2].     
In order to deal with the characteristics of modern transportation systems as well as 
other industrial safety-critical systems, paradigm changes to the existing safety engi-
neering approaches have been proposed [3, 4].  Proponents of resilience engineering, 
  
for example, have suggested regarding safety not simply as the absence of accidents, 
but rather as the ability to succeed under varying conditions [5].   
The concept of functional resonance, developed within the resilience-engineering 
paradigm, describes accidents as the detectable “signal” that emerges from the unin-
tended interaction of everyday variability.  The Functional Resonance Analysis Me-
thod (FRAM) [6] is a corresponding modeling approach that has been put forward as 
a novel way of modeling and understanding the behavior of complex systems.  FRAM 
has been used in a number of contexts including air traffic management [7], railway 
traffic management [8], healthcare [9] and financial services [10].         
The functional description used by FRAM may be particularly useful for describ-
ing and analyzing systems at higher levels of abstraction.  There is relatively little 
empirical evidence to demonstrate the application of FRAM to the detailed analysis of 
complex systems at different levels of abstraction.  A possible strength of FRAM may 
be to make explicit the link between task-based and technical system descriptions, 
resulting in a federation of different modeling approaches.    
The aim of this paper is to explore whether and how such a federation of different 
models can provide greater understanding of functional resonance in a real-world 
scenario.  Section 2 provides a brief description of the avionics case study.  Section 3 
describes the learning generated through the application of FRAM.  Sections 4 and 5, 
respectively, describe the learning generated from the application of a task-based 
modeling approach (HAMSTERS) and a petri-net based approach (ICO).  Section 6 
integrates and discusses the findings generated by this federation of models.  Section 
7 provides conclusions and suggestions for future research.   
2 Weather Radar Interactive System 
Weather radar (WXR) is an application currently deployed in many cockpits of 
commercial aircrafts. It provides support to pilots’ activities by increasing their 
awareness of meteorological phenomena during the flight journey, allowing them to 
determine if they may have to request a trajectory change, in order to avoid storms or 
precipitations for example.  Annex 1 shows, on the cockpit of the Airbus A380, the 
distribution of various components dealing with weather radar.  
Fig. 1 presents a screenshot of the weather radar control panel, used to operate the 
weather radar application. This panel provides two functionalities to the crew. The 
first one is dedicated to the mode selection of weather radar and provides information 
about status of the radar, in order to ensure that the weather radar can be set up cor-
rectly. The operation of changing from one mode to another can be performed in the 
upper part of the panel.  
The second functionality, available in the lower part of the window, is dedicated to 
the adjustment of the weather radar orientation (Tilt angle). This can be done in an 
automatic way or manually (Auto/manual buttons).  Additionally, a stabilization func-
tion aims to keep the radar beam stable even in case of turbulences. The right-hand 
part of Fig. 1 presents an image of the controls used to configure radar display, partic-
ularly to set up the range scale (right-hand side knob with ranges 20, 40, … nautical 
miles).  
           
Fig. 1. Image of a) the weather radar control panel b) of the radar display manipulation 
 
Fig. 2. Screenshot of weather radar displays 
Fig. 2 shows screenshots of weather radar displays according to two different range 
scales (40 NM for the left display and 80 NM for the right display). Spots in the mid-
dle of the images show the current position, importance and size of the clouds. 
The next three sections describe the learning for safety analysis generated by using 
complementary modeling approaches combined as a federation of models.   
3 Functional Representation - FRAM 
The safety analysis using FRAM is based on a functional representation of the system.  
Each function is described using six aspects - TROPIC (Time, Resource, Output, 
Precondition, Input, Control).  The analysis using FRAM aims to investigate how the 
variability of the output of functions may propagate through the system, and how this 
propagation of variability may contribute to situations of functional resonance.     
Fig. 3 graphically illustrates the functions identified for this case study. FRAM 
does not explicitly differentiate between the actors that perform a function.  In the 
figure we have included an explicit representation of actors through the use of differ-
ent levels of grey.  Human functions are represented in light grey (continuous line for 
pilot functions while dotted for the air traffic controller).  Functions performed by 
technical systems are represented in dark grey.  Interactive functions are represented 
in medium grey. The functional description is hierarchical, so that functions can be 
  
represented at higher levels of abstraction or with greater detail as required. For  
example, in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 there is a function “Check weather conditions”, which  
is an abstraction of several lower-level functions (not represented in Fig. 3 above  
due to space constraints). This “macro” function includes system, human and  
interactive functions.  Such an abstraction provides support for the representation  
of a larger number of functions while keeping the graphical model representation 
understandable. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Excerpt of FRAM functions for the weather radar socio-technical system 
The FRAM instantiation shown in Fig. 4 describes a scenario where the pilot rece-
ives a clearance from the ATCO to change heading.  The pilot checks the current 
weather situation and realizes that weather perturbations require a different route.  
Subsequently, the pilot requests a new clearance, which is eventually provided by the 
ATCO (who has to handle the impact of the refusal to implement the clearance on 
potential conflicts).  In this scenario, the provision of the clearance also defines the 
timing parameter for executing the clearance, including checking the weather situa-
tion.  Prior to executing a clearance the crew should check the weather conditions 
hence the latter function is a precondition for the former.   
This simplified FRAM representation allows us to reason about the propagation of 
variability.  For example, the provision of the clearance could vary in terms of its 
timing aspect, i.e. it could be provided late (for instance according to complex con-
flicts in the sector).  In this case, there is less than adequate time available to execute 
the clearance.  In such a situation, there may be a trade-off between efficiency and 
thoroughness in such a way that the weather check may be omitted (i.e. the precondi-
tion between execute clearance and check weather conditions) in order to save time.  
 This would lead to an execution of the clearance, rather than to the more appropriate 
request for a new clearance.   
The functions provide clearance and request clearance use a shared resource, i.e. 
the communication link, which typically has limited bandwidth.  A variation in the 
availability of this resource will again have implications for the timing of the func-
tions.  So, the assessment based on the FRAM representation suggests that variability 
due to timing and resource aspects may lead to potentially hazardous situations.  The 
limitation of this approach is that without further models of human and technological 
systems behaviors, it is very difficult to explore and explain this potentially hazardous 
situation further.  The next two sections will describe examples of such complementa-
ry modeling approaches that together may provide greater analytical power especially 
exhibiting quantitative information.  
 
 
Fig. 4. FRAM instantiation (change heading clearance not feasible due to weather conditions)  
4 Representing Operators’ Tasks Using HAMSTERS 
HAMSTERS1 is a tool-supported graphical task-modeling notation aiming at 
representing human activities in a hierarchical and ordered way. Goals can be decom-
posed into sub-goals, which can in turn be decomposed into activities, and the output 
of this decomposition is a graphical tree of nodes. Nodes can be tasks or temporal 
operators. 
Tasks can be of several types (as illustrated in Fig. 5) and contain information such 
as a name, information details, critical level… Only the high-level task type are pre-
sented here (due to space constraints) but they are further refined (for instance the 
cognitive tasks can be refined in Analysis and Decision tasks [1]). 
 
                                                     
1
 http://www.irit.fr/recherches/ICS/softwares/hamsters/index.html 
  
 
Fig. 5. High-level task types in HAMSTERS 
Temporal operators are used to represent temporal relationships between sub-goals 
and between activities. Some of them are represented in the task models below. Main 
ones are >> for sequence, ||| for concurrent, [> for interruptions and [] for exclusive 
choice.  
Tasks can also be tagged by temporal properties to indicate whether or not they are 
iterative, optional or both [1]. Composition and structuration mechanisms have been 
introduced in order to provide support for description of complex activities [11]. One 
main element of these mechanisms is subroutine. A subroutine is a group of activities 
that a user performs several times possibly in different contexts and which might ex-
hibit different types of information flows. A subroutine can be represented as a task 
model and a task model can use a subroutine to refer to a set of activities. This ele-
ment of notation enables the distribution of large amount of tasks across different task 
models and factorization of the number of tasks. 
HAMSTERS also provides support for representing how particular objects (data, 
information, knowledge ...) are related to particular tasks. 
Fig. 6 illustrates the three relationships (input, output or input/output) between ob-
jects and tasks that can be expressed with HAMSTERS notation. Objects may be 
needed as an input to accomplish a particular task (as illustrated in Fig. 6a) by the 
incoming arrow). Particular tasks may generate an object or modify it (as illustrated in 
Fig. 6b and 6c)). According to the case study, the pilot has two main goals:  
“Keep awareness of weather situation” which includes the sub-goal “Checking 
weather conditions” (Fig. 7) and “Change heading” (not detailed here but involved in 
the execution of the considered clearance).  
The task model in Fig. 7 represents crew activities performed in order to check 
weather conditions. At the higher level of the tree, there is an iterative activity  
(circular arrow symbol) to “detect weather targets” that is interrupted (operator [>) by a 
cognitive task “mental model of current weather map is built”. 
 
a) b) c)  
Fig. 6. Relationships between tasks and objects in HAMSTERS 
 Fig. 7. HAMSTERS task model of the “Check weather conditions” goal 
 
 
Fig. 8. HAMSTERS task model of the subroutine “Manage weather radar” task 
  
Other human tasks include perception (task “Perceive image”) and motor (task 
“Turn knob”). Connection between crew’s activities and cockpit functions is made 
through interactive tasks (as input “Turn knob” and output “Rendering of radar infor-
mation”). The time required for performing the latter heavily depends on the radar 
type. Such behavioral aspects of systems can be modeled using ICO notation and Pet-
Shop tool as detailed in section 5. The task “Manage weather radar” is a subroutine 
task detailed in Fig. 8 and is performed after selecting a range and before analyzing the 
image produced by the weather radar. This task model corresponds to the manipulation 
of the user interface presented in Fig. 1 a). From these models we can see that the tasks 
to be performed in order to check weather conditions in a given direction are rather 
complex. The time required to perform them depends on 3 elements: the operator’s 
performance in terms of motor movements, perception and cognitive processing. Hu-
man performance models such as the one proposed in [12] can be used to assess diffi-
culties and delays but the overall performance of the socio-technical system involves 
interaction and system execution times. Next section proposes a modeling approach for 
representing these two aspects while performance issues are presented in section 6. 
5 Representing Technical Systems Using ICO Models 
ICO [13] is used in this case study to model behavioral aspects of the system subpart 
of the interactive cockpit applications dealing with the weather radar. The following 
sections detail two models representing the interaction for controlling the weather 
radar parameters.  
Mode Selection and Tilt Angle Setting 
The first model presented here describes how it is possible to handle the weather radar 
configuration of both its mode and its tilt angle. Fig. 1 shows the interactive means 
provided to the user to: 
• Switch between the five available modes (upper part of the figure) using radio 
buttons (the five modes being WXON to activate the weather radar detection, OFF 
to switch it off, TST to trigger a hardware checkup, STDBY to switch it on for test 
only and WXA to focus detection on alerts). 
• Select the tilt angle control mode (lower part of the figure) amongst three modes (fully 
automatic, manual with automatic stabilization and manual selection of the tilt angle). 
Fig. 9 presents the description of the behavior of this part of the interactive cockpit 
using the ICO formal description technique and may be divided into two parts. 
• The Petri net in the upper part handles events received from the 5 radio buttons. The 
current selection (an integer value from 1 to 5) is carried by the token stored in 
MODE_SELECTION place and corresponds to one the possible radio buttons (OFF, 
STDBY, TST, WXON, WXA). The token is modified by the transitions (new_ms = 
3 for instance) using variables on the incoming and outgoing arcs as formal parame-
ters of the transitions. Each time the mode value is changed, the equipment part 
(represented by the variable wxr within the token) is set up accordingly. 
• The Petri net in the lower part handles events from the four buttons and the text 
field (modify tilt angle). Interacting with these buttons changes the state of the 
 
  
Fig. 9. Behavior of the WRX mode selection and tilt angle setting 
application. In the current state, this part of the application is in the state fully au-
tomatic (a token is in AUTO place). To reach the state where the text field is avail-
able for the angle modification, it is necessary to bring the token to the place 
STABILIZATION_OFF by successively fire the two transitions switchManual_T1 
and switchStabOff_T1 (by using the two buttons MANUAL and OFF represented 
by Fig. 1), making transition change_Angle_T1 available. The selected angle must 
belong to the correct range (-15 to 15), controlled by the three transitions angleIs-
Low, angleIsCorrect and angleIsHigh. When checked, the wxr equipment tilt angle 
is modified, represented by the method called wxr.setTiltangle. 
 
Range Selection  
The setting of the range detection of the weather radar is done using a FCU physical 
knob (see Fig. 1b) by switching between 6 values (from 1 to 6). Each time the value is set 
an event is raised (holding this value) by the knob and received by a dedicated part of the  
 
 
Fig. 10. Behavior of the range selection  
  
 
cockpit application. This part of the application is represented by the model of Fig. 10 
that maps the value (form 1 to 6) into a range value that is sent to the WRX equipment. 
The event is received and the selected value is extracted by one of the two  
transitions called valueChanged_T1 and valueChanged_T2. The place RangeMapping 
contains the mapping between a value and the corresponding range (for instance 1 
corresponds to range 10, 2 to 20…). Finally, the wxr equipment range is set with the 
selected range by the firing of transition mapIndexToRange. 
6 Time and Performance Aspects 
To allow performance assessment we have to address timing issues at three levels: the 
operator side using the task models presented in section 4, the system side exploiting 
the ICO behavior models in section 5, the interaction side related to the graphical 
interface described also in ICOs in section 5. 
 
Operators’ Performance from Task Models 
To qualitatively evaluate the performance of the weather radar graphical interface, we 
first restricted the study to the interaction with the weather radar control panel (see 
Fig. 1a), which is handled using a trackball (the other part being handled using the 
knob). One of the evaluation approaches used in human factors domain is based on 
Fitts’s law [14] which is suitable for assessing motor movements. Fitts’s law is pre-
sented in Formula (1) representing an index of difficulty for reaching a target (of a 
given size) from a given distance. Movement time for a user to access a target  
depends on width of the target (W) and the distance between the start point of the 
pointer and the center of target (A). 
MT = a + b log2(1+2A/W) (1)
For predicting movement time on the systems under consideration constants are set 
as follows: a=0 and b=100ms (mean value for users).  
Fig. 11 presents the set of interactive widgets used within the weather radar control 
panel. For each widget, it provides a short name used for the following tables and  
the size used as the width for the Fitts’s law (we use the minimum value between the 
width and the height to provide the assessment of the maximum difficulty to reach the 
considered widget). 
Fig. 12 provides the distances from the center to each widget and between each 
widget. These distances are used to apply the Fitts’s law when reaching a widget with 
a start point that can be the center of the control panel or any widget. 
 
radio
button
off
radio
button
stdby
radio
button
tst
radio
button
wxon
radio
button
wxa
button
Auto
button
Manual
button
ON
button
OFF
text
field
angle
short name r1 r2 r3 r4 r5 b1 b2 b3 b4 t1
min size 18 18 18 18 18 31 31 31 31 26
 
Fig. 11. Interactive widgets width used for the Fitts’s law application 
r1 r2 r3 r4 r5 b1 b2 b3 b4 t1
c 104 130 115 100 87 77 17 128 104 132
 b) 
r1 r2 r3 r4 r5 b1 b2 b3 b4 t1
c 110 119 114 108 103 77 32 97 89 105
 
Fig. 12. Distance from the control panel center a) Temporal values (in ms) for user interaction 
using Fitts’s b) 
 Model Transition Duration (ms) 
WXR control panel model Off_T1 500 
Stdby_T1 200 
Wxa_T1 500 
Wxon_T1 1000 
Tst_T1 1000 
angleIsLow 2000-4000 
angleIsCorrect 2000-4000 
angleIsHigh 2000-4000 
Range selection model mapIndexToRange 200 
Fig. 13. Delays introduced by interaction 
In addition to these motor values cognitive and perceptive values have to be used in 
order to cover all the elements of the task models. From [12] we know that the mean 
time for performing a comparison at the cognitive level is 100ms (ranging from 25ms to 
170ms) while eye perception mean is 100mn too (ranging from 50ms to 200ms).  
Weather Radar System Time (Associated to ICO Models) 
In the ICO Petri net dialect, time is directly related to transition, which invokes ser-
vices from the weather radar system (this is the case for transition off_T1 on Fig. 9 
which switches off the equipment). The duration of each invocation is presented on 
Fig 13 (each value is coarse grain and depends on the type of weather radar). The 
2000-4000ms value corresponds to the time required by the weather radar to scan the 
airspace in front of the aircraft (two or three scans are needed to get a reliable image). 
Using the task models in Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 and the values above we can estimate the 
overall performance of the crew to perform the “check weather condition” task. The over-
all time cannot be less than 30 seconds provided that several ranges have to be checked in 
turn. Going back to FRAM model presented on Fig. 4 the function “check weather condi-
tion” is a strong bottleneck and influences the entire socio technical system. 
7 Conclusion 
The paper outlined how a federation of three complementary modeling paradigms could 
be a useful approach in order to explore situations of functional resonance within socio-
technical systems.  FRAM provided a high-level view of possible dependencies in the 
system under consideration.  These dependencies were then further explored using 
HAMSTERS for human activities, and ICO-Petshop for technical systems covering both 
interaction techniques on the user interfaces and the underlying hardware and software 
systems. The analysis presented in this paper represents a first step and the results are 
preliminary.  A possible limitation of the approach is that there is no clear algorithm for 
how the three models can interact.  At present, this relies on the skill of the analyst.  This 
may pose problems in the analysis of large systems, where a greater level of tool support 
may be required for the analysis but it is important to note that most of the modeling 
activities are supported by tools and that performance evaluation techniques are partially 
available as for ICOs with Petri nets theory [15] and HAMSTERS with dedicated tools 
presented in [11]. Future research should investigate the generalizability of this case study 
to larger systems. The possibility of formalizing the interaction between the models at the 
different levels of analysis should be explored further. Lastly, variability and resonance 
  
can also occur through system failure occurs or operators errors. We aim at integrating 
previous work we have done in the area of systems reconfiguration [16] and systematic 
account for human error using task models [17] to address variability for all the 
components of the socio-technical system. 
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